tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post2178296758016019772..comments2024-03-28T13:40:26.497+00:00Comments on M-Phi: Soames on the Abstract View Jeffrey Ketlandhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01753975411670884721noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-90383573868139503692012-10-17T20:46:14.841+01:002012-10-17T20:46:14.841+01:00Hi Tristan,
I see now - but that expressions are ...Hi Tristan,<br /><br />I see now - but that expressions are abstract is not controversial, because expressions are finite sequences, and sequences are abstract. Also, expressions are required to be closed under concatenation, and therefore there are infinitely many of them for most languages of any interest. E.g., a propositional language $L$ with one letter P and negation $\neg$. So, the $L$-formulas are $P, \neg P, \neg \neg P$, etc.<br />By "spatio-temporal representations", I think you mean expression tokens? But these are quite different from expressions. And the syntax of a language specifies certain sets (usually infinite) of expressions; syntax is entirely silent about tokens.<br /><br />Still, what languages are is controversial, and it is languages (not anything to do with tokens of their expressions) that are finely individuated.<br /><br />Cheers,<br /><br />JeffJeffrey Ketlandhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01753975411670884721noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-5921842550663792892012-10-17T05:33:00.380+01:002012-10-17T05:33:00.380+01:00Hi Jeff,
Thanks for the clarifications. Still, I...Hi Jeff, <br /><br />Thanks for the clarifications. Still, I see the fine-grainedness as being a separate, independent feature from the regarding of expressions as abstract things rather than spatiotemporal representations. The name 'The Abstract View' only captures the latter, whereas the former part of the view seems just as important, if not more.<br /><br />TristanTristan Hazehttp://sprachlogik.blogspot.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-78424305788824274192012-10-16T12:58:38.077+01:002012-10-16T12:58:38.077+01:00Hello Tristan,
Fine-grainedness means that only a...Hello Tristan,<br /><br />Fine-grainedness means that only a tiny change in the extension of just one expression involves a new language. But it does not imply that all the *other* expressions mean differently. Two languages L1 and L2 may have identical syntax, and almost identical semantics, differing on the meaning of only one word. Fine-grainedness implies that L1 is distinct from L2. (Cf., the fact that sets X and Y are distinct does not imply they do not overlap. Languages may have exactly the same set of expressions and sentences, but merely differ on what these expressions mean.) So, ...<br /><br />"we may not be able to say that two people A and B have uttered the same proposition or sentence"<br /><br />Certainly speakers can utter the same sentence or assert the same proposition. Suppose that L1 and L2 are the languages A and B speak. <br />Sentences are merely strings; so S may belong to both L1 and L2. So, A and B can utter the same sentence, say S.<br /><br />Propositions are semantic values (intensions) of sentences. But a sentence S may mean differently in L1 and L2. So, A and B have asserted the same proposition in uttering S iff L1(S) = L2(S).<br /><br />JeffJeffrey Ketlandhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01753975411670884721noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-13307894064977770372012-10-15T02:14:03.404+01:002012-10-15T02:14:03.404+01:00Fantastic post! One thought: it seems like maybe a...Fantastic post! One thought: it seems like maybe a lot of what is most distinctive about this view is not that languages and propositions are taken as abstract, non-spatiotemporal things, but rather the fine-grainedness of the notions of terms and propositions: change the reference, and you change which linguistic object you're looking at.<br /><br />This part of the view seems (to me now at least) to be independent of whether sentences are regarded as abstract syntactic types, or token marks and noises - on the second conception, we may not be able to say that two people A and B have uttered the same proposition or sentence, but we can register the same sort of point by saying something like: A and B have uttered wholly equivalent propositions, or two propositions which are identical with respect to syntactic and semantic properties.<br /><br />If something like that is workable, then perhaps 'The Abstract View' is not the best name for the view outlined in your post, and perhaps its two notable features - abstractness of linguistic items, and fine-grainedness - should be seen as quite separate things.Tristan Hazehttp://sprachlogik.blogspot.com/noreply@blogger.com