tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post4318291037596013252..comments2017-11-02T06:53:27.860+00:00Comments on M-Phi: The Quine-Putnam Indispensability ArgumentJeffrey Ketlandhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01753975411670884721noreply@blogger.comBlogger12125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-86725675183111364502017-08-25T09:36:06.567+01:002017-08-25T09:36:06.567+01:00According to you, if an thing referred to by a mat...According to you, if an thing referred to by a mathematical equation does not "exist", then the equation is false. This seems to me to be a self-serving claim. After all, if "2" does not exist, that would mean that "2 + 2 = 4" is necessarily false.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-21730374274240228362017-05-10T12:33:53.607+01:002017-05-10T12:33:53.607+01:00Your post is so informative for me. I want somethi...Your post is so informative for me. I want something like this only. Thanks for sharing it. <a href="https://www.couponpitara.com/offers/godaddy/" rel="nofollow"> Godaddy Coupon Codes </a> Rachel Millerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12543423759166681111noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-76086287197601423122017-03-28T11:17:10.898+01:002017-03-28T11:17:10.898+01:00Thanks for sharing this awesome post,
This is real...Thanks for sharing this awesome post,<br />This is really very cool and informative blog.<br /><a href="http://myappsforpc.org/download-imessage-for-windows/" rel="nofollow">iMessage for windows </a>Download iMessagehttp://myappsforpc.org/download-imessage-for-windows/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-68423648502003910342016-05-12T07:33:28.637+01:002016-05-12T07:33:28.637+01:00This comment has been removed by the author.Sunita Yadavhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07556562955355941270noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-90563119690957926112015-12-23T09:02:10.959+00:002015-12-23T09:02:10.959+00:00There are numerous things that join PhD concentrat...There are numerous things that join PhD concentrates once you finish them well. In the first place, there is smugness with a feeling of achievement. Then again, it opens you to a superior vocation universe of your decision. <a href="http://www.phdresearchproposal.org/" rel="nofollow">proposal for phd research</a>zainhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12302758293006899784noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-32322023971336369532014-06-08T00:14:22.936+01:002014-06-08T00:14:22.936+01:00To be clear, my view of nominalism DOES support th...To be clear, my view of nominalism DOES support the view that nominalism can make statements, or prove entities, albeit these are not entities in the sense of mathematics. For example, the categorical-deductive sets {A-B:C-D, A-D:C-B} can refer to any appropriate object in space, although with some level of metaphoricalization, or at least some statement about its intended functionality.<br /><br />More about this in my book, The Dimensional Philosopher's Toolkit (2013, 2014), not to be confused with Baggini and Fosl's classic.Nathan Coppedgehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13272730626911068222noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-69581781772963017972013-01-26T22:12:23.275+00:002013-01-26T22:12:23.275+00:00I think Quine's argument is syntactic, while h...I think Quine's argument is syntactic, while his style is semantic.Nathan Coppedgehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13272730626911068222noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-82880233852999269462013-01-26T22:06:54.368+00:002013-01-26T22:06:54.368+00:00Here is a contention and agreement. One extension ...Here is a contention and agreement. One extension of Quine's argument is that all forms of abstracta reduce to 'applications' which only have validity through pragmatic reference. Then not only does math get caught up in a vast contingency of conflating validity with usefulness or vice versa (a kind of Jacob's Ladder problem), but there is an appealing argument for the universalism of applications that may open mathematics to what you call 'mixed functions'. <br /><br />For example, if a set is not a universal set in terms of its contents, what is it saying about its usefulness? Although this may reduce adequately to a claim that a function is an application, it would do not not make assumptions about what this means---since 'application' suddenly may mean 'mathematics' to the mathemician---it does not mitigate arguments that 'other applications' could be equally useful. Perhaps this amounts to the claim that mathematicians are attracted to an 'illusory' usefulness much in the way that statisticians sometimes become poor economists.<br /><br />I find it appealing that mathematics may be 'just one form' of usefulness, and I think there is no implicit problem in widening the field of potential quasi-mathematical applications. The question is really one of standardization, once it is accepted---I think it is obvious to accept---that mathematics is a form of nominalism. And amongst other questions is the question of whether math has been 'synched' to real cognitive processes, or instead merely taps into strengths and weaknesses, proving things that are already true about the mind, yet remain trivial.Nathan Coppedgehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13272730626911068222noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-55371435031729311942013-01-20T16:47:44.688+00:002013-01-20T16:47:44.688+00:00Colin,
Yes, in a nutshell, that sounds right.
Bu...Colin,<br /><br />Yes, in a nutshell, that sounds right. <br />But I think Azzouni formulates matters *epistemically* (in terms of beliefs, etc.), whereas Quine's analysis is semantic, and concerns the existential implications of sentences. That is, if a sentence (e.g., a natural language sentence) $S$ is regimented as $\exists x Fx$, then $S$ implies that there are $F$s. <br />There is wriggle room here at the "regimentation" stage; so Quine gives lots of examples of eliminating apparent existential implications in Word & Object. <br />But not so much wriggle room, I think, at the semantic implication stage, because it's hard to see what $\exists x Fx$ could mean except that there are $F$. For the semantic clause defining $\exists x Fx$ is: it's true iff there are $F$s. I suppose one could have say a free logic, or a number of different quantifiers in operation, with inner and outer domains and whatnot. This is a sort of Graham Priest direction. But I think this isn't what Azzouni has in mind, and it's connected to speaker intentions and beliefs, as you say. <br /><br />So, as far as I understand it, Azzouni notion of "ontological commitment" is an epistemic notion, rather than Quine's semantic one.<br /><br />JeffJeffrey Ketlandhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01753975411670884721noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-21013897094084115712013-01-20T16:05:39.624+00:002013-01-20T16:05:39.624+00:00Joseph,
"is the 'advantage that issues f...Joseph,<br /><br />"is the 'advantage that issues from the elimination of mathematicalia" basically that science then becomes nominalism friendly? and is the appeal of nominalism for the would be scientific realist partly explained by the worry that realism about abstracta and mathematicalia seem to make a thoroughgoing materialism impossible?"<br /><br />Right. <br />The advantage is ontological parsimony; so a nominalized scientific theory doesn't require the existence of abstract entities (like vector fields, or vectors). So one can defuse the epistemological problem of "access": how we "know" about abstract entities, given that they're non-causal.<br />Field also highlights another advantage, namely that a nominalized theory (of the kind he gives in his 1980 monograph) explains the conventional role played by the mathematical aspects of usual scientific theories. Roughly, the mathematics is only increasing the conceptual simplicity of theories (which is why it is useful), and not contributing to its genuine physical content.<br /><br />JeffJeffrey Ketlandhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01753975411670884721noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-86836723890142319012013-01-20T15:05:09.488+00:002013-01-20T15:05:09.488+00:00Ad 3.1, I think the basic idea in it's negativ...Ad 3.1, I think the basic idea in it's negative form is simple enough. It is just a rejection of the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment. One can quantify-over without being-committed-to. This naturally raises a lot of questions about what the criteria for commitment *are*. I think Azzouni's answer is unsatisfying in this respect, but one can imagine how this project might go, e.g. it might have something to do with believer/speaker intentions.Colin Carethttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11764726376012276409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-49843264275449948022013-01-20T11:41:29.420+00:002013-01-20T11:41:29.420+00:00Thanks Jeff for your concise and clear summary. Co...Thanks Jeff for your concise and clear summary. Could I ask, not having read Field, is the 'advantage that issues from the elimination of mathematicalia" basically that science then becomes nominalism friendly? and is the appeal of nominalism for the would be scientific realist partly explained by the worry that realism about abstracta and mathematicalia seem to make a thoroughgoing materialism impossible?<br /><br />apologies for any naivetÃ©, not a professional philosopher and all that. josephhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12475144653171858939noreply@blogger.com