tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post5433220021602088725..comments2024-03-28T13:40:26.497+00:00Comments on M-Phi: Logic and external target phenomenaJeffrey Ketlandhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01753975411670884721noreply@blogger.comBlogger15125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-71217040792130004142011-05-09T19:51:40.649+01:002011-05-09T19:51:40.649+01:00Trouble is, how people DO reason doesn't reall...Trouble is, how people DO reason doesn't really fix the meaning the way you'd like it to, as there is a significant amount of interpersonal variation. Check this out:<br /><br />Stenning, K., Cox, R. and Oberlander, J. (1995b). Attitudes to logical independence:<br />traits in quantifier interpretation. Proceedings of Seventeenth Meeting of the Cognitive<br />Science Society, Pittsburgh 1995. pps. 742–747.Catarinahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03277956118114314573noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-42606984783121565022011-05-09T00:46:34.807+01:002011-05-09T00:46:34.807+01:00Yep. If I needed a cartoon slogan it would be: How...Yep. If I needed a cartoon slogan it would be: How people DO reason fixes the meaning, which then determines the facts regarding how they OUGHT to reason (which could be very different from how they do reason, in spite of the role of the one has in determining the other).RoyTCookhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05233569728242084863noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-24830582373427315582011-05-07T12:37:52.481+01:002011-05-07T12:37:52.481+01:00In that case, I understand your position much bett...In that case, I understand your position much better, and if it is indeed close to Corcoran's view of Aristotle's logic, then I think there's lots to recommend about it.<br /><br />But I'd still like to emphasize that the 'fixing the meaning' part is highly non-trivial. I know you are in principle not really interested in how people 'really' reason (not with respect to this issue, in any case), but in their work on reasoning, Stenning & van Lambalgen draw a distinction between reasoning TO an interpretation and reasoning FROM an interpretation: the first one would be the 'fix the meaning' part of the whole thing, and that's where a lot of the complication arises.Catarinahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03277956118114314573noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-69318393395793941612011-05-06T22:38:21.669+01:002011-05-06T22:38:21.669+01:00I am not sure this is going to be helpful, but I s...I am not sure this is going to be helpful, but I see the situation as one analogous to the following observation about apriority. After telling students that a priori truths are truths that can be known independent of experience, some clever student will point out that this means there can't be any a priori truths, since we need to learn the meanings of the expressions involved, and this is always empirical. We then point out that what we meant was that a priori truths can be known independently of any empirical investigation <i> other than that required to learn the meanings of the expressions involved </i>.<br /><br />Similarly, I am willing to grant much of what you say about meaning: The meanings of words are influenced by our behavior in complex ways, and thus the determination of the meaning of a particular expression will almost always involve some empirical and psychological 'stuff'. But on my view consequence is posterior to meanings - first the meanings are determined, and then once meanings are fixed, we ask about what follows from what. And my view is that this second task is independent of empirical or psychological 'stuff' (other than whatever is required to determine what the expressions mean in the first place, along similar lines to the story for apriority above). In short, meaning determination might be empirical, but once those facts are fixed, consequence isn't.RoyTCookhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05233569728242084863noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-90770145564434473112011-05-06T14:36:58.379+01:002011-05-06T14:36:58.379+01:00Jeff and Roy (I think I can reply to you both in o...Jeff and Roy (I think I can reply to you both in one goal),<br /><br />Roy, I'm not really surprised to hear about Corcoran's (tacit) influence here. Stewart told me at some point that he realizes more and more how much he seems to have absorbed from Corcoran's ideas (btw, in the JPL paper I mentioned in the post we talk a lot about Corcoran and his interpretation of syllogistic -- full circle!).<br /><br />But let me see if I manage to articulate more clearly the worries I have with taking logical consequence couched in natural language as the target phenomenon. I am prepared to see the point of a 'metaphysical' understanding of the relation of logical consequence, but only once the relata have a determined meaning. But as we all know, expressions in natural language need us people in many cases to acquire a determined meaning (given that they often allow for multiple readings). So they are too 'volatile' to serve as the relata here, people need to get involved for the meaning to be established, and then the relation is no longer purely metaphysical, in this sense. I am not entirely comfortable with taking propositions or other abstract entities as relata either, but at least in that case the metaphysical position would be more tenable. <br /><br />I guess what's underlying my position is a staunch commitment to a 'meaning is use' approach to language. I am happy to concede that, given a certain formal system with clear formation and transformation rules a la Carnap, whether something follows from something else is a 'metaphysical' matter in that the actual deeds of agents have no role to play. But I don't see how a story like that could fly with so-called 'natural languages' (don't like the phrase either...)Catarinahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03277956118114314573noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-4877499422807897702011-05-06T09:03:30.137+01:002011-05-06T09:03:30.137+01:00Catarina,
Your comments about Corcoran are more o...Catarina,<br /><br />Your comments about Corcoran are more on the mark than you think. I spent a few years writing my dissertation on this logic-as-modeling stuff with Stu, and we were both thinking of the project as one that developed some original ideas in a paper of Stu's. It was embarassingly late in the process that Stu and I re-read some of Corcoran's stuff, and we both realized that we had really gotten it from Corcoran (me, filtered through Stu, and Stu had forgotten how much of it was essentially already in Corcoran's writings on the topic).RoyTCookhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05233569728242084863noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-81176850486133447892011-05-05T17:59:14.317+01:002011-05-05T17:59:14.317+01:00Hi Catarina, "all kinds of complications rela...Hi Catarina, "all kinds of complications related to contingent properties of a given language".<br />One can argue that languages have their phonetic, syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties essentially. For suppose in w1, the string "wibble" refers in L to cats; suppose in w2, the string "wibble" refers in L* to potatoes. Then L is not identical to L*. <br />On this view, any change - even the tiniest - of syntax, reference, meaning, etc., is a change of language. So languages are individuated extremely finely.<br />In all likelihood, the language I "speak" is not identical to the language anyone else "speaks" - they're distinct idiolects. Similar, but not exactly identical. So, languages do not have any contingent properties.<br />Similarly for ambiguity, etc.. If a string "fnoffle" has, say, 7 meanings in L and 17 meanings in L*, then L and L* are distinct. Or, if languages coincide exactly in their syntax and semantics, but have some, perhaps minor, differences in their assertibility conditions, then again they're distinct.Jeffrey Ketlandhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01753975411670884721noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-86389543935038197392011-05-05T12:22:40.921+01:002011-05-05T12:22:40.921+01:00Roy, if your position is the 'metaphysical'...Roy, if your position is the 'metaphysical' one as I sketched above, then I am more sympathetic to it than I would be otherwise :) But what I find problematic in how you and Stewart present the argument is the emphasis on 'natural language' as the medium; it opens the door to all kinds of complications related to contingent properties of a given language, problems with uniqueness of meaning and interpretations etc.<br /><br />But otherwise, the 'metaphysical' view is basically the view that Corcoran (your professional grand-father! there is really a lineage thing going on here...) attributes to Aristotle, and it seems to me to be a compelling way to think about the relation of logical consequence.Catarinahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03277956118114314573noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-20619847847632042152011-05-05T12:15:53.401+01:002011-05-05T12:15:53.401+01:00Hi Mathieu/anonymous,
I never intended to claim t...Hi Mathieu/anonymous,<br /><br />I never intended to claim that logic is to be *reduced* to the syntax-semantics perspective. In the context of the paper that I took the quote from, these two concepts play a crucial role in the discussion, but that is certainly not intended to imply that this is the only way to make sense of logic. Actually, if you google me, you will see that most of my published work is on medieval logic, which I don't hesitate to call *logic*, and yet obviously the narrow syntax-semantics perspective isn't in any way appropriate to describe what was going on then.Catarinahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03277956118114314573noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-66854014064291742842011-05-05T00:51:27.481+01:002011-05-05T00:51:27.481+01:00I can't believe you disagree with me and Stewa...I can't believe you disagree with me and Stewart on modeling! Given how, over the years, Stewart and I seem to agree on less and less, I would think that the fact that it is one of the few things that we still agree on is almost incontrovertible evidence that it is true! Ha!<br /><br />Seriously, though: Your brief sketch is exactly what I think. Of course, as your comments already make clear, there are important things that must be said about how to connect this essentially metaphysical issue regarding connections between statements (or propositions, or whatever) to issues regarding reasoning. And you are right - people get it wrong a LOT. But that's okay, what we are modeling is not how people actually reason, but how people <i>ought</i> to reason. <br /><br />Things are of course more complicated than this. First, we have the fact that our best method for accumulating initial intuitions regarding logical consequence is to examine how people do reason, and this seems uncomfortable if we are eventually going to devise a view that suggests that most people are bad reasoners. In addition, we are (in my opinion) still lacking any kind of real account of the connection between the objective facts about logical connections between statement, which may be abstract, but which are decidedly non-normative; and the corresponding claims about how we ought to reason, which are decidedly normative (I feel the ghost of Moore looking down on me as I write this!) I guess this is the real issue, since as these comments make clear, I don't thing we have to choose between your "exists 'out there' in a more or less ontologically independent way" and your "have a bearing on people's actual inferential practices?' - well, at least insofar as fact about rightness and wrongness have a bearing on actual inferential practices. But I agree that if we are going to take this option, a lot more needs to be said.<br /><br />One last point: It is worth emphasizing that believing that the logical consequence relation is 'out there' to be discovered and modeled does not entail that this relation is completely determinate. In fact, suspicions that it isn't determinate fuel my interest in logical pluralism.RoyTCookhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05233569728242084863noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-29256681478923895922011-05-03T11:32:34.045+01:002011-05-03T11:32:34.045+01:00Hi Roy,
Regarding your first point, I of course e...Hi Roy,<br /><br />Regarding your first point, I of course entirely agree :) As philosophers, what we should be interested in are the connections between logical systems and their target phenomena; otherwise we are just lousy mathematicians :D<br /><br />As for your second point, I actually disagree with your view that the target phenomenon in question is the relation of logical consequence *as couched in natural languages*. More generally, I disagree with yours and Stewart’s view that formal languages are models of natural languages, but that’s going to be a long story… But let me just try to understand your position better: do you mean to say that the relation of logical consequence exists ‘out there’ in a more or less ontologically independent way (depending only on the existence of the language), or does it also have a bearing on people’s actual inferential practices? If the latter, then it becomes to some extent an empirical issue, and as it turns out, the thus far available evidence strongly suggests that people do NOT reason in ways that resemble what we view as the relation of logical consequence (as necessary truth-preservation).<br /><br />But maybe we can discuss these issues in more detail at some point; I haven’t seen you in ages!Catarinahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03277956118114314573noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-44479031517385867952011-05-03T11:16:11.870+01:002011-05-03T11:16:11.870+01:00Hi Vincenzo,
Thanks for the comments! Regarding p...Hi Vincenzo,<br /><br />Thanks for the comments! Regarding pre-theoretical, I usually draw the distinction between being prior to *some* theory (existential reading) and being prior to *any* theory (universal reading). My fear is that people slip very easily between the two. The universal reading is the one I think is completely bonkers (not sure if anyone defends it in all words, but I do think it is sometimes tacitly endorsed). As for the existential reading, it only becomes informative if the theory in question is sufficiently important for there to be a real bite in the concept being prior to it. That’s why I was toying around with the idea of ‘extra-theoretical’, meaning external to the logical system itself (in the ‘transcendent’ sense).<br /><br />As for ‘intuitive’, it is crucial to be clear on WHOSE intuitions we are talking about. This is of course related to the massive ongoing debate on the role of intuitions in philosophical methodology; my general take on the whole thing is that these intuitions are *precisely* what needs to be looked into, whereas a widespread position is to take them more or less at face-value: you hit rock-bottom, and no reasonable debate is possible anymore. I’ve written a couple of posts on how I see the roles of intuition in philosophy over at New APPS, I can look up the links if people are interested.<br /><br />In sum, while I think your points make good sense, I’m still suspicious of these notions :)Catarinahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03277956118114314573noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-25962084663397137602011-05-03T06:15:47.643+01:002011-05-03T06:15:47.643+01:00It’s a very interesting subject. Here are my 2 cen...It’s a very interesting subject. Here are my 2 cents. I consider logic as the theory of reasoning. So, the target phenomenon is first our capacity, as human beings, to conceive and deduce. This kind of enquiry can be extended to machine and computer. It can be also applied to different fields of knowledge: mathematics, physics, etc. So, the target phenomenon gives for me the definition of logic. <br />This position is really old fashioned and will be highly suspect, for instance from the point of view of mathematical logic. But I do not agree that the claim 'logic = syntax + semantics' is an uncontroversial observation. This stance has some drawbacks. I agree that it's actually the standard norm when you present a logical system to offer a completeness proof. But what about all the researchers who worked before this modern area (Aristotle, Leibniz, Frege, etc.)? Did they do logic or not? I imagine that technical tools and norms can also evolve. So I don’t think that the technical characterization that you give will survive very long in the future. I prefer to keep the definition of logic as the theory of reasoning, whatever the means employed to work on this subject.<br /><br />MathieuAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-33707467579784371092011-05-03T01:39:48.217+01:002011-05-03T01:39:48.217+01:00First off, I will just (in a rather grouchy, old-f...First off, I will just (in a rather grouchy, old-fashioned way, but that's just how I think about these things!) point out that I find it completely mysterious why any philosopher who doesn't believe in a target phenomenon of some sort would be interested in logic in the first place (I have met such people, but I don't understand them). Of course, these logics might be <i>mathematically</i> interesting, but that is irrelevant, one would think, to the philosophical issues.<br /><br />With regard to the target phenomenon itself, I would say that in the simplest case it is just the relation of logical consequence - a relation that holds between statements (or propositions or whatever) in virtue of their logical form (whatever <i>that</i> is!) Calling this relation "pre-theoretic" or "intuitive" seems, to me, to be a kind of category mistake - these terms characterize, at best, our epistemic relationship to the phenomenon in question. But the relation itself is just 'out there' (or, at least, is 'out there' once the language came into existence in the first place), and we use formal logics in an attempt to provide precise mathematical models of that relation.<br /><br />I suspect that many will find my view of the matter naive or controversial at best. But there it is.RoyTCookhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05233569728242084863noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-59273000329640237432011-05-02T21:53:10.352+01:002011-05-02T21:53:10.352+01:00Hi Catarina,
thanks for the post! Let me try a de...Hi Catarina,<br /><br />thanks for the post! Let me try a defence of both "pre-theoretical" and "intuitive". <br /><br />With "pre-theoretical" one does not need to commit to a target that is neutral to ANY theory, only to the theoretical options that are contextually entertained. Unlike its "absolute" counterpart, this sort of contextual neutrality does not seem out of reach. <br /><br />Likewise, "intuitive" can be safely applied to something that is PRESUMABLY shared by the parties in a given context. Of course, such a presumption holds if and until a persuasive challenge is raised, in which case it might well turn out to be unwarrented. That is, the candidate "external" constraint was not "intuitive" (or "pre-theoretical") ENOUGH. <br /><br />Makes sense?Vincenzo Crupihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08069145846190162517noreply@blogger.com