tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post6356235679145785857..comments2024-03-28T13:40:26.497+00:00Comments on M-Phi: A Dutch Book argument for linear poolingJeffrey Ketlandhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01753975411670884721noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-87505052069852335252021-12-23T11:27:10.532+00:002021-12-23T11:27:10.532+00:00Grateful for you writing this blogGrateful for you writing this blogKevinhttps://www.kevinsharma.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-492402297568783112018-12-13T14:24:21.887+00:002018-12-13T14:24:21.887+00:00I wanted to thank you for this great read!! Posts ...I wanted to thank you for this great read!! Posts are very helpful.<br /><a href="https://www.ehotelsreviews.com" rel="nofollow">The best hotel rooms</a>GG.https://www.blogger.com/profile/05600965326195361758noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-37779875713585792362018-01-07T09:07:54.398+00:002018-01-07T09:07:54.398+00:00Thanks for this, Rush. Yes, you're right that ...Thanks for this, Rush. Yes, you're right that I have to be more careful about how I state that. What linear pooling guarantees is that, if all experts prefer A to B, then the aggregate prefers A to B. And, as this result shows, only linear pooling entails that. But, as you point out, it is possible that all experts reject A in favour of B or C, while the aggregate favours A. The Miners Paradox would be a case of this. But what will happen in this situation is that one expert prefers B to A to C, and the other prefers C to A to B, and the aggregate prefers A to B/C.Richard Pettigrewhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07828399117450825734noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4987609114415205593.post-58853906478836514662018-01-02T16:15:51.366+00:002018-01-02T16:15:51.366+00:00Interesting post. You write, "Since one of th...Interesting post. You write, "Since one of the things we might wish to use an aggregate to do is to help us make communal decisions, a putative aggregate cannot be considered acceptable if it will lead us to make a binary choice one way when every expert agrees that it should be made the other way." I was wondering what you might think about the SSK example at the end of their "Coherent Choice Functions under Uncertainty" paper. There, two experts unanimously reject an option in a three-option menu. But this option is uniquely admissible according to the .5-.5 convex combination of the two expert opinions.Rushnoreply@blogger.com