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Utilitarianism and risk: a reply to Mogensen

Like Lara Buchak , I think rationality permits many different attitudes to risk: without ever falling into irrationality, you might be extremely risk-averse, quite risk-averse, just a little risk-averse, risk-neutral, a teeny bit risk-inclined, very risk-inclined, exorbitantly risk-inclined, and many points in between. To illustrate, suppose you are offered a choice between two units of utility for sure ( Sure Thing in the pay-off table below) and a gamble that gives a 50% chance of five units of utility and 50% chance of none ( Gamble below). Then I think rationality permits you to be risk-averse and choose the sure thing, and it permits you to be risk-neutral and choose the gamble, in line with expected utility theory.  $$\begin{array}{r|cc}& \text{Heads} & \text{Tails} \\ \hline \text{Sure Thing} & 2 & 2 \\ \text{Gamble} & 5 & 0 \end{array}$$ This raises an interesting question for utilitarians. In what follows, I'll focus on total utilitarianism, in pa

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