The Guitar Language

Nobody can be forbidden to use any arbitrarily producible event or object as a sign for something. (Frege 1892, "On Sense and Reference")

I have an extremely liberal notion of what a language is---Lewis's abstract view. A language is any bunch of syntax, possibly along with meaning functions. The syntax can be pretty much anything; the symbols can be pretty much anything; the meaning functions can be pretty much anything; and the meaning values can be pretty much anything.

I want to define a language ${\mathbf{L}}_G$, which I'll also call the Guitar Language.

First let me stipulate (just for this context here)  that "$e$" be a name of my Epiphone guitar, and "$r$" be a name for my Rickenbacker guitar and "$y$" be a name for my Yamaha guitar. So, $e$, $r$ and $y$ are my guitars. (You do understand this! I have just temporally augmented your idiolect by a local baptism.)

Second let me define three propositions:

$p_1=$ the proposition that Paul McCartney is a lizard.
$p_2=$ the proposition that Yoko Ono was born in Wrexham.
$p_3=$ the proposition that Ringo Starr plays drums.

Finally I define the Guitar Language ${\mathbf{L}}_G$:

(1) the alphabet of ${\mathbf{L}}_G$ is $\{e,r,y\}$. The only strings in ${\mathbf{L}}_G$ are these symbols.
(2) the meanings of these strings, relative to ${\mathbf{L}}_G$, are given by the following meaning function ${\mu }_{{\mathbf{L}}_G}$:

${\mu }_{{\mathbf{L}}_G}(e)=p_1$.
${\mu }_{{\mathbf{L}}_G}(r)=p_2$.
${\mu }_{{\mathbf{L}}_G}(y)=p_3$.

(3) For any guitar $g\in \{e,r,y\}$, an action is a speech act of asserting ${\mu }_{{\mathbf{L}}_G}(g)$ in ${\mathbf{L}}_G$ iff it consists in tapping the machine head of the G-string of $g$ twice, with one's left thumb.

This language ${\mathbf{L}}_G$ is a very simple "signalling language". It has only three symbols and no significant (i.e., combinatorial) syntax. The contents of the signals are (eternal) propositions (usually, of course, the content of a signal is indexical in some way, such as "The house is on fire right now!"). Now what would it mean for an agent (or mind) to speak/cognize the language ${\mathbf{L}}_G$? What would it mean for the mind of an agent to assign these propositions to these symbols?

It seems that the right thing to say is that an agent cognizes ${\mathbf{L}}_G$ by being disposed to perform the relevant speech act of ${\mathbf{L}}_G$ when in the right mental state; i.e., when a symbol is "asserted", then the propositional content of the agent's mental state is identical to the propositional content of the symbol.

Unfortunately, speaking ${\mathbf{L}}_G$ requires being able to perform these speech acts, which means being able to tap the guitars, so even though you might speak/cognize ${\mathbf{L}}_G$, you might never get the chance to actually make an assertion in ${\mathbf{L}}_G$.

But just for good measure, here is a photo of the symbols, $e$, $r$ and $y$: