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Strange Beliefs about Abstract Objects

Occasionally, the strange belief that mathematical objects are physical objects is advocated. I am truly baffled when I hear such beliefs. Here are the some questions:
Is the number 0 a physical object?
Is the number 22222222 a physical object?
Is the wellorder (ω,<) a physical object?
Is the topological space R4 a physical object?
Is the Lie group SU(3) a physical object?
Is the rank Vω+57 a physical object?
For example, what is the mass of (ω,<)? Can you find it somewhere, perhaps at Tesco's?

Comments

  1. AJ JA23 June 2013 at 19:57

    I would believe this only if this was advocated by abstract objects.

    Seriously, where has this been advocated?

    ReplyDelete
  2. Jeffrey Ketland23 June 2013 at 20:13

    Hi AJ JA

    Ultrafinitists make this claim. E.g.,

    http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Ultrafinitism.html

    They insist, e.g., that because a physical computer, say, is finite, there aren't numbers beyond what it represents. But this philosophical conclusion requires the further assumption that numbers *are* physical objects. This assumption is the one that is not justified.

    Cheers,

    Jeff

    ReplyDelete
  3. Jeffrey Ketland23 June 2013 at 20:26

    Hi again AJ JA,

    It is advocated by E.B. Davies (see E.B. Davies, 2005: "Some Remarks on the Foundations of Quantum Theory", Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 56, p. 530.)
    See

    http://m-phi.blogspot.co.uk/2011/04/2-become-1.html

    Cheers,

    Jeff

    ReplyDelete
  4. Jeffrey Ketland23 June 2013 at 21:26

    Hi AJ JA,

    Another example - the physicality of mathematical objects is advocated by Doron Zeilberger:

    "(ii) the traditional real line is a meaningless concept. Instead the real REAL ‘line’, is neither real, nor a line. It is a discrete necklace! In other words R = hZp, where p is a huge and unknowable (but fixed!) prime number, and h is a tiny, but not infinitesimal , ‘mesh size’. Hence even the potential infinity is a meaningless concept."

    http://www.math.rutgers.edu/~zeilberg/mamarim/mamarimPDF/real.pdf

    Zeilberger's philosophical view here simply assumes that mathematical objects (such as R) must be *physical*. Otherwise, the relevant concept is, he says, "meaningless".

    But the reasonable view is that R is an abstract object, and its connection, if any, to the physical world is something to be investigated empirically.

    Cheers,

    Jeff

    ReplyDelete
  5. AJ JA24 June 2013 at 08:51

    Thanks, Jeff!

    Cheers,
    A

    ReplyDelete

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