Deferring to rationality -- does it preclude permissivism?
Permissivism about epistemic rationality is the view that there are bodies of evidence in response to which rationality permits a number of different doxastic attitudes. I'll be thinking here about the case of credences. Credal permissivism says: there are bodies of evidence in response to which rationality permits a number of different credence functions.
Over the past year, I've watched friends on social media adopt remarkably different credence functions based on the same information about aspects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the outcome of the US election, and the withdrawal of the UK from European Union. And while I watch them scream at each other, cajole each other, and sometimes simply ignore each other, I can't shake the feeling that they are all taking rational stances. While they disagree dramatically, and while some will end up closer to the truth than others when it is finally revealed, it seems to me that all are responding rationally to their shared evidence, their opponents' protestations to the contrary. So permissivism is a very timely epistemic puzzle for 2020. What's more, this wonderful piece by Rachel Fraser made me see how my own William James-inspired approach to epistemology connects with a central motivation for believing in conspiracy theories, another major theme of this unloveable year.
One type of argument against credal permissivism turns on the claim that rationality is worthy of deference. The argument begins with a precise version of this claim, stated as a norm that governs credences. It proceeds by showing that, if epistemic rationality is permissive, then it is sometimes impossible to meet the demands of this norm. Taking this to be a reductio, the argument concludes that rationality cannot be permissive. I know of two versions of the argument, one due to Daniel Greco and Brian Hedden, and one due to Ben Levinstein. I'll mainly consider Levinstein's, since it fixes some problems with Greco and Hedden's. I'll consider David Thorstad's response to Greco and Hedden's argument, which would also work against Levinstein's argument were it to work at all. But I'll conclude that, while it provides a crucial insight, it doesn't quite work, and I'll offer my own alternative response.
Roughly speaking, you defer to someone on an issue if, upon learning their attitude to that issue, you adopt it as your own. So, for instance, if you ask me what I'd like to eat for dinner tonight, and I say that I defer to you on that issue, I'm saying that I will want to eat whatever I learn you would like to eat. That's a case of deferring to someone else's preferences---it's a case where we defer conatively to them. Here, we are interested in cases in which we defer to someone else's beliefs---that is, where we defer doxastically to them. Thus, I defer doxastically to my radiographer on the issue of whether I've got a broken finger if I commit to adopting whatever credence they announce in that diagnosis. By analogy, we sometimes say that we defer doxastically to a feature of the world if we commit to setting our credence in some way that is determined by that feature of the world. Thus, I might defer doxastically to a particular computer simulation model of sea level change on the issue of sea level rise by 2030 if I commit to setting my credence in a rise of 10cm to whatever probability that model reports when I run it repeatedly while perturbing its parameters and initial conditions slightly around my best estimate of their true values.
In philosophy, there are a handful of well-known theses that turn on the claim that we are required to defer doxastically to this individual or that feature of the world---and we're required to do it on all matters. For instance, van Fraassen's Reflection Principle says that you should defer doxastically to your future self on all matters. That is, for any proposition
As I mentioned above, the deference argument begins with a specific, precise norm that is said to govern the deference we should show to rationality. The argument continues by claiming that, if rationality is permissive, then it is not possible to satisfy this norm. Here is the norm as Levinstein states it, where
Deference to Rationality Suppose:
is your credence function; is your total evidence; ; is a probabilistic credence function; ;
then rationality requires
Notice, first, that Levinstein's principle is quite weak. It does not say of just anyone that they should defer to rationality. It says only that, if you are in the dire situation of being certain that you are yourself irrational, then you should defer to rationality. If you are sure you're irrational, then your conditional credences should be such that, were you to learn of a credence function that it's a rational response to your evidence, you should fall in line with the credences that it assigns conditional on that same assumption that it is rational. Restricting its scope in this way makes it more palatable to permissivists who will typically not think that someone who is already pretty sure that they are rational must switch credences when they learn that there are alternative rational responses out there.
Notice also that you need only show such deference to rational credence functions that satisfy the probability axioms. This restriction is essential, for otherwise (DtR) will force you to violate the probability axioms yourself. After all, if
Now, suppose:
is your credence function; is your total evidence; and are probabilistic credence functions with That is, and are distinct and remain distinct even once they become aware that both are rational responses to ; . That is, you give some credence to both of them being rational responses to ; . That is, you are certain that your own credence function is not a rational response to .
Then, by (DtR),
Thus, conditioning both sides of the first identity on
But, by assumption,
One thing to note about this argument: if it works, it establishes not only that there can be no two different rational responses to the same evidence, but that it is irrational to be anything less than certain of this. After all, what is required to derive the contradiction from DtR is not that there are two probabilistic credence functions
Let's turn, then, to a more substantial worry, given compelling voice by David Thorstad: (DtR) is too strong because the deontic modality that features in it is too strong. As I hinted above, the point is that the form of the deference principles that Greco & Hedden and Levinstein use is borrowed from cases---such as the Reflection Principle and the Principal Principle---in which there is just one expert value, though it might be unknown to you. In those cases, it is appropriate to say that, upon learning the single value and nothing more, you are required to set your credence in line with it. But, unless we simply beg the question against permissivism and assume there is a single rational response to every body of evidence, this isn't our situation. Rather, it's more like the case where you defer to a group of experts, such as a group of climate models. And in this case, Thorstad says, it is inappropriate to demand that you set your credence in line with an expert's credence when you learn what it is. Rather, it is at most appropriate to permit you to do that. That is, Levinstein's principle should not say that rationality requires your credence function to assign the conditional credences stated in its consequent; it should say instead that rationality allows it.
Thorstad motivates his claim by drawing an analogy with a moral case that he describes. Suppose you see two people drowning. They're called John and James, and you know that you will be able to save at most one. So the actions available to you are: save John, save James, save neither. And the moral actions are: save John, save James. But now consider a deference principle governing this situation that is analogous to (DtR): it demands that, upon learning that it is moral to save James, you must do that; and upon learning that it is moral to save John, you must do that. From this, we can derive a contradiction in a manner somewhat analogous to that in which we derived the contradiction from (DtR) above: if you learn both that it is moral to save John and moral to save James, you should do both; but that isn't an available action; so moral permissivism must be false. But I take it no moral theory will tolerate that in this case. So, Thorstad argues, there must be something wrong with the moral deference principle; and, by analogy, there must be something wrong with the analogous doxastic principle (DtR).
Thorstad's diagnosis is this: the correct deference principle in the moral case should say: upon learning that it is moral to save James, you may do that; upon learning that it is moral to save John, you may do that. You thereby avoid the contradiction, and moral permissivism is safe. Similarly, the correct doxastic deference principle is this: upon learning that a credence function is rational, it is permissible to defer to it. In Levinstein's framework, the following is rationally permissible, not rationally mandated:
I think Thorstad's example is extremely illuminating, but for reasons rather different from his. Recall that a crucial feature of Levinstein's version of the deference argument against permissivism is that it applies only to people who are certain that their current credences are irrational. If we add the analogous assumption to Thorstad's case, his verdict is less compelling. Suppose, for instance, you are currently committed to saving neither John nor James from drowning; that's what you plan to do; it's the action you have formed an intention to perform. What's more, you're certain that this action is not moral. But you're uncertain whether either of the other two available actions are moral. And let's add a further twist to drive home the point. Suppose, furthermore, that you are certain that you are just about learn, of exactly one of them, that it is permissible. And add to that the fact that, immediately after you learn, of exactly one of them, that it is moral, you must act---failing to do so will leave both John and James to drown. In this case, I think, it's quite reasonable to say that, upon learning that saving James is permissible, you are not only morally permitted to drop your intention to save neither and replace it with the intention to save James, but you are also morally required to do so; and the same should you learn that it is permissible to save John. It would, I think, be impermissible to save neither, since you're certain that's immoral and you know of an alternative that is moral; and it would be impermissible to save John, since you are still uncertain about the moral status of that action, while you are certain that saving James is moral; and it would be morally required to save James, since you are certain of that action alone that it is moral. Now, Levinstein's principle might seem to holds for individuals in an analogous situation. Suppose you're certain that your current credences are irrational. And suppose you will learn of only one credence function that it is rationally permissible. At least in this situation, it might seem that it is rationally required that you adopt the credence function you learn is rationally permissible, just as you are morally required to perform the single act you learn is moral. So, is Levinstein's argument rehabilitated?
I think not. Thorstad's example is useful, but not because the case of rationality and morality are analogous; rather, precisely because it draws attention to the fact that they are disanalogous. After all, all moral actions are better than all immoral ones. So, if you are committed to an action you know is immoral, and you learn of another that it is moral, and you know you'll learn nothing more about morality, you must commit to perform the action you've learned is moral. Doing so is the only way you know how to improve the action you'll perform for sure. But this is not the case for rational attitudes. It is not the case that all rational attitudes are better than all irrational attitudes. Let's see a few examples.
Suppose my preferences over a set of acts
Something similar happens in the credal case, at least according to the accuracy-first epistemologist. Suppose I have credence
So, even in the situation in which Levinstein's principle is most compelling, namely, when you are certain you're irrational and you will learn of only one credence function that it is rational, still it doesn't hold. It is possible to be sure that your credence function is an irrational response to your evidence, sure that an alternative is a rational response, and yet not be required to adopt the alternative because learning that the alternative is rational does not teach you that it's better than your current irrational credence function for sure---it might be much worse. This is different from the moral case. So, as stated, Levinstein's principle is false.
However, to make the deference argument work, Levinstein's principle need only hold in a single case. Levinstein describes a family of cases---those in which you're certain you're irrational---and claims that it holds in all of those. Thorstad's objection shows that it doesn't. Responding on Levinstein's behalf, I narrowed the family of cases to avoid Thorstad's objection---perhaps Levinstein's principle holds when you're certain you're irrational and know you'll only learn of one credence function that it's rational. After all, the analogous moral principle holds in those cases. But we've just seen that the doxastic version doesn't always hold there, because learning that an alternative credence function is rational does not teach you that it is better than your irrational credence function in the way that learning an act is moral teaches you that it's better than the immoral act you intend to perform. But perhaps we can narrow the range of cases yet further to find one in which the principle does hold.
Suppose, for instance, you are certain you're irrational, you know you'll learn of just one credence function that it's rational, and moreover you know you'll learn that it is better than yours. Thus, in the accuracy-first framework, suppose you'll learn that it accuracy dominates you. Then surely Levinstein's principle holds here? And this would be sufficient for Levinstein's argument, since each non-probabilistic credence function is accuracy dominated by many different probabilistic credence functions; so we could find the distinct
Not so fast, I think. How you should respond when you learn that
The crucial point is this: learning that
Indeed, you might be compelled to adopt something other than
In sum: For someone certain their credence function
This is a terrific and fascinating post, Richard! I'm 100% with you in endorsing permissivism about rational credences. But actually I think that Ben Levinstein's principle "Deference to Rationality" (DtR) has an even more radical flaw than the one that you identify.
ReplyDeleteBroadly speaking, the problem with this principle is akin to the one that Julia Staffel identified in "Should I pretend I'm perfect?". It a principle that focuses on the case of an agent who has a grossly irrational credence function c, and then tries to specify what rationality requires of the agent in question, by imposing conditions on c itself. We just shouldn't expect there to be any true satisfiable principles of this sort.
The problem can be revealed particularly clearly if we assume my account of the meaning of the operator 'Rationality requires of you at t that...'. According to my account, this operator is equivalent to 'At all the relevantly available worlds at which your credences are perfectly rational at t,...'. Crucially, all the "relevantly available" worlds need to be exactly like the actual world with respect to what determines which credence functions are rational for you at t and which are not (and the degree to which these functions are irrational).
So, now consider a proposed principle of the form 'If at t you have the grossly irrational credence function c, then rationality requires of you at t that...'.
Clearly, if this principle has any chance of being true, then it must imply that part of what rationality requires of you in this case is precisely that you do not have c. Instead, what rationality requires of you in this case is that you have a different credence function c' instead - perhaps one of the closest fully rational credence functions to c, but certainly not c itself.
However, instead of characterizing any of these alternative credence functions that it is rational for you to have in this case, DtR just imposes a condition on this irrational credence function c - even though c is not the credence function that you have at any of the relevantly available worlds at which you are perfectly rational at t. But there is absolutely no reason to think that this irrational credence function meets this condition. Indeed, we can just stipulate that it doesn't. So, DtR is obviously false.
Admittedly, there is also another interpretation of Levinstein's principle. On this second interpretation, the principle has the form 'If c is irrational, then at any available world at which c is rational...' But as I noted above, all the "relevantly available" worlds need to be exactly like the actual world with respect to what determines which credence functions are rational and which are not. So, if c is actually irrational, there are no relevantly available worlds where c is perfectly rational. Thus, on this interpretation, DtR is utterly vacuous, just like a universally quantified statement of the form 'At all mathematically possible worlds where 0=1,...' Obviously, we should not expect such a principle to be, as you put it, "satisfiable"!
Thank you for expressing my worry far better than I could.
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