Over the summer, I got interested in the problem of the priors again. Which credence functions is it rational to adopt at the beginning of your epistemic life? Which credence functions is it rational to have before you gather any evidence? Which credence functions provide rationally permissible responses to the empty body of evidence? As is my wont, I sought to answer this in the framework of epistemic utility theory. That is, I took the rational credence functions to be those declared rational when the appropriate norm of decision theory is applied to the decision problem in which the available acts are all the possible credence functions, and where the epistemic utility of a credence function is measured by a strictly proper measure. I considered a number of possible decision rules that might govern us in this evidence-free situation: Maximin, the Principle of Indifference, and the Hurwicz criterion. And I concluded in favour of a generalized version of the Hurwicz criterion, which I axiomatised. I also described which credence functions that decision rule would render rational in the case in which there are just three possible worlds between which we divide our credences. In this post, I'd like to generalize the results from that treatment to the case in which there any finite number of possible worlds.
Here's the decision rule (where is the utility of at world ).
Generalized Hurwicz Criterion Given an option and a sequence of weights with , which we denote , define the generalized Hurwicz score of relative to as follows: if then That is, is the weighted average of all the possible utilities that receives, where weights the highest utility, weights the second highest, and so on.
The Generalized Hurwicz Criterion says that you should order options by their generalized Hurwicz score relative to a sequence of weightings of your choice. Thus, given ,And the corresponding decision rule says that you should pick your Hurwicz weights and then, having done that, it is irrational to choose if there is such that .
Now, let be an additive strictly proper epistemic utility measure. That is, it is generated by a strictly proper scoring rule. A strictly proper scoring rule is a function such that, for any , is maximized, as a function of , uniquely at . And an epistemic utility measure is generated by if, for any credence function and world ,where
In what follows, we write the sequence to represent the credence function .
Also, given a sequence of numbers,
letThat is, is the average of the numbers in . And given , let . That is, is the truncation of the sequence that omits all terms after . Then we say that does not exceed its average if, for each ,That is, at no point in the sequence does the average of the numbers up to that point exceed the average of all the numbers in the sequence.
Theorem 1 Suppose is a sequence of generalized Hurwicz weights. Then there is a sequence of subsequences of such that
- each does not exceed its average
Then, the credence functionmaximizes among credence functions for which .
This is enough to give us all of the credence functions that maximise : they are the credence function mentioned together with any permutation of it --- that is, any credence function obtained from that one by switching around the credences assigned to the worlds.
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose is a measure of epistemic value that is generated by the strictly proper scoring rule . And suppose that is the following sequence of generalized Hurwicz weights with .
First, due to a theorem that originates in Savage and is stated and proved fully by Predd, et al., if is not a probability function---that is, if ---then there is a probability function such that for all worlds . Thus, since GHC satisfies Strong Dominance, whatever maximizes will be a probability function.
Now, since is generated by a strictly proper scoring rule, it is also truth-directed. That is, if , then . Thus, if , thenThis is what we seek to maximize. But notice that this is just the expectation of from the point of view of the probability distribution .
Now, Savage also showed that, if is strictly proper and continuous, then there is a differentiable and strictly convex function such that, if are probabilistic credence functions, then
So maximizes among credence functions with iff minimizes among credence functions with . We now use the KKT conditions to calculate which credence functions minimize among credence functions with .
Thus, if we write for , then
So
Let So,
So the KKT theorem says that is a minimizer iff there are such thatThat is, iff there are such that
By summing these identities, we get:
So, for ,
So, for ,
Now, suppose that there is a sequence of subsequences of such that
- each does not exceed its average.
And let Then we write if is in the subsequence . So, for , . Then
Now, suppose is in . Then
So, if is the length of the sequence ,But, by assumption, this is true for all . So minimizes , as required.
We now show that there is always a series of subsequences that satisfy (1), (2), (3) from above. We proceed by induction.
Base Case . Then it is clearly true with the subsequence .
Inductive Step Suppose it is true for all sequences of length . Now consider a sequence . Then, by the inductive hypothesis, there is a sequence of sequences such that
- each does not exceed its average.
Now, first, suppose . Then let and we're done.
So, second, suppose . Then we find the greatest such thatThen we let . Then we can show that
- .
- Each does not exceed average.
- .
(1) and (3) are obvious. So we prove (2). In particular, we show that does not exceed average. We assume that each subsequence starts with
- Suppose . Then, since does not exceed average, But, since is the greatest number such thatWe know thatSoSo
- Suppose . Then, since does not exceed average, But, since is the greatest number such thatWe know thatSoBut also, from above,So
- And so on.
This completes the proof.
And with these tips in hand you can with a bit of trial and error approach find your own optimum balance coupled with some practice and experimentation. But all in all, some over-arching principles will prove to be very helpful in your daily juicing routine when making juices with PortOBlend Review. So let’s hop into it.
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